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Abstract. We formally study two privacy-type properties in online auc-
tion protocols, bidding-price-secrecy and receipt-freeness. These proper-
ties are formalised as observational equivalences in the applied pi cal-
culus. We analyse the receipt-free auction protocol by Abe and Suzuki.
Bidding-price-secrecy of the protocol is verified using ProVerif, whereas
receipt-freeness of the protocol is proved manually.
1 Introduction
Auctions are ways to negotiate the exchange of goods and commodities. In an
auction, a seller offers an item for bid, buyers submit bids, and the seller sells
the item to the buyer with the highest bid. Nowadays, with the widely spread
use of the Internet, online auctions are more and more often used as a conve-
nient way to trade. Real-life examples are well-known websites like eBay, eBid,
Yahoo!auctions and so on. Online auction protocols are also the subject of an
active field of research [1–6].
For online auction systems, privacy is a fundamental property, e.g. personal
information of bidders should not be revealed to other persons or companies. In
order to protect the privacy of bidders, the following basic privacy-type proper-
ties are required.
Bidding-price-secrecy: A protocol preserves bidding-price-secrecy if an ad-
versary cannot determine the bidding price of any bidder.
Receipt-freeness: A protocol satisfies receipt-freeness if a bidder cannot prove
how he bids to an adversary.
We study the protocol AS02 proposed by Abe and Suzuki [4]. Abe and Suzuki
claim that their protocol satisfies the above two requirements for non-winning
bidders and provide an informal analysis. However, security protocols are no-
toriously difficult to design and analyse, and proofs of security protocols are
known to be error-prone, thus we do not want to rely on an informal analy-
sis. In several cases, formal verification found security flaws in protocols which
were thought to be secure [7, 8]. Formal verification has shown its strength in
finding attacks and proving correctness of security protocols. In this paper, we
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formally verify whether bidding-price-secrecy and receipt-freeness hold in their
protocol. We model the AS02 protocol using the applied pi calculus [9]. The
applied pi calculus provides an intuitive way to model concurrent systems, es-
pecially security protocols. Moreover, it is supported by ProVerif [10], a veri-
fication tool which can be used to verify a number of security properties au-
tomatically. As suggested in [11], we use observational equivalence to express
bidding-price-secrecy and receipt-freeness in the applied pi calculus. Previously,
formalisation of privacy-type properties has already been successfully executed
in the domain of voting [12, 11] (similar ideas were developed in a different formal
framework [13]). Bidding-price-secrecy for the AS02 protocol is verified automat-
ically using ProVerif, whereas receipt-freeness is proven manually. We show that
both of the two properties hold for non-winning bidders.
2 The applied pi calculus
For better understanding of the paper, we introduce the applied pi calculus briefly
in this section, including its syntax, semantics and the definition of observational
equivalence (for more details, see [9]). The applied pi calculus is a language
for modelling concurrent systems, in particular security protocols. We use the
applied pi calculus for its two main advantages: it provides an intuitive way to
describe a protocol and cryptographic primitives can be defined by users.
Syntax. The calculus assumes an infinite set of names (which are used to repre-
sent communication channels or other atomic data), an infinite set of variables
and a signature Σ consisting of a finite set of function symbols, which are used
to model cryptographic primitives. Terms are defined as names, variables, and
function symbols applied to terms. An equational theory E is defined as a set
of equations on terms. The equivalence relation induced by E is denoted as
=E . Systems are described as processes: plain processes and extended processes.
Plain processes are defined as:
P,Q,R ::= plain processes
0 null process
P | Q parallel composition
!P replication
νn.P name restriction
if M =E N then P else Q conditional
in(u, x).P message input
out(u,M).P message output.
Null process 0 does nothing. Parallel composition P | Q represents sub-process
P and sub-process Q running in parallel. Replication !P represents an infinite
number of process P running in parallel. Name restriction νn.P bounds name
n in process P , which means name n is secret to adversary. Term M =E N
represents equality over the equational theory rather than strict syntactic iden-
tity. Message input in(u, x).P reads a message from channel u, and bounds the
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message to variable x in the following process P . Message output out(u,M).P
sends message M on channel u, and then runs process P . We can also write “let
x = M in P” to represent P{M/x}. Extended processes add variable restrictions
and active substitutions. By restricting names and variables, we can bind a name
or a variable to certain processes. An active substitution {M/x} means a variable
x can be replaced by term M in every process it comes into contact with. We say
an extended process is closed if all its variables are either bounded or defined by
an active substitution. The process νx.({M/x} | P ) corresponds exactly to “let
x = M in P”. Active substitutions allow us to map an extended process A to its
frame ϕ(A) by replacing every plain process in A with the null process 0, which
does nothing. A frame is defined as an extended process built up from 0 and
active substitutions by parallel composition and restrictions. The frame ϕ(A)
can be viewed as an approximation of A that accounts for the static knowledge
A exposes to its environment, but not A’s dynamic behaviour. The domain of a
frame ϕ, denoted as dom(ϕ), is the set of variables for which the frame ϕ defines
a substitution. A context C[ ] is defined as an extended process with a hole. An
evaluation context is a context whose hole is not in the scope of a replication, a
condition, an input, or an output. A context C[ ] closes A when C[A] is closed.
Semantics. Two operational semantics are mentioned in this paper: internal
reductions, denoted as →, and labelled reductions, denoted as α−→. Internal re-
ductions allow a process to execute without contacting its environment, for ex-
ample, internal sub-processes communicate with each other, or the process eval-
uates and executes conditional operations (if-then-else). Labelled reductions are
used to reason about processes that interact with their contexts. The transition
A
α−→ B means process A performs α action and continues as process B. Action
α is either reading a term M from the process’s context, or sending a name or
a variable of base type to the context. Specificlly, when the output is a term M ,
out(u,M).P is rewritten into νx.({M/x} | P ).
Adversary model. To model security protocols, adversaries need to be taken into
consideration. Following the Dolev-Yao model [14], an adversary has full control
of the network. An adversary can eavesdrop, replay, block and inject messages.
An adversary can be modelled as an arbitrary process running in parallel with
the protocol, which can interact with the protocol in order to gain information.
Observational equivalence. Observational equivalence means an adversary can-
not distinguish two processes. Intuitively, two processes are equivalent if they
output on the same channels, no matter what the context they are placed in.
Definition 1 (Observational equivalence [9]). Observational equivalence is
the largest symmetric relation R between closed extended processes with the same
domain such that A R B implies:
1. if A can send a message on channel c, then B can also send a message on
channel c;
2. if A→∗ A′ then, for some B′, there exists B →∗ B′, and A′ R B′;
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3. C[A] R C[B] for all closing evaluation contexts C.
In practice, observational equivalence is hard to use, because of the quantification
over contexts. Therefore, labelled bisimilarity is introduced. Labelled bisimilarity
is easier to reason with manually or automatically. Two notations are used in
labelled bisimilarity: static equivalence (≈s) and labelled bisimilarity (≈`). Static
equivalence compares the static states of processes (represented by their frames),
while labelled bisimilarity examines their dynamic behaviour.
Definition 2 (Labelled bisimilarity [9]). Labelled bisimilarity (≈`) is de-
fined as the largest symmetric relation R on closed extended processes, such that
process A R B implies:
1. A ≈s B;
2. if A→ A′ then B →∗ B′ and A′ R B′ for some B′;
3. if A α−→ A′ and fv(α) ⊆ dom(A) and bn(α)∩fn(B) = ∅; then B →∗ α−→→∗ B′
and A′ R B′ for some B′.
Labelled bisimilarity and observational equivalence coincide [9].
3 AS02 sealed-bid online auction protocol
Sealed-bid auctions are a type of auction in which bidders submit their bids
without knowing what other bidders bid. The bidder with the highest bid wins
the auction and pays the price he submitted.
Abe and Suzuki propose a sealed-bid auction protocol [4]. This protocol in-
volves n bidders b1, . . . , bn and k auctioneers a1, . . . , ak. A price list is published
before the protocol. During the protocol, each bidder sends a commit for every
price in the price list: ‘yes’ if he wants to bid that price, ‘no’ otherwise. Auc-
tioneers work together to open the commitments of all bidders from the highest
price down until the winning bid(s) is/are found.
In order to ensure privacy of bidders, the protocol has two physical assump-
tions: a bidding booth for the bidders, and a one-way untappable channel from
every bidder to every auctioneer. The bidding booth enables a bidder to pri-
vately submit a bid free from control or observation of a coercer/buyer. The
untappable channels ensure no eavesdropper can see messages sent.
Before starting the protocol, one auctioneer publishes an increasing price list
p1, . . . , pm, a message Myes for “I bid”, a message Mno for “I do not bid”, a
generator g of subgroup of Z∗p with order q, where q, p are large primes with
p = 2q + 1. The protocol consists of two phases: bidding and opening.
Bidding phase. A bidder in the bidding booth chooses a secret key x, publishes
his public key h = gx with a predetermined signature. Then the bidder chooses
a series of random numbers r1, . . . , rm as secret seeds, one random number for
each price, and decides a price p to bid for. Then he generates a bit-commitment
for each price p` (1 ≤ ` ≤ m), using the following formula:
Commit` =
{
gMyeshr` if p` = p (a bid for price p)
gMnohr` if p` 6= p (not a bid for price p`)
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Next, the bidder publishes the sequence of the bit-commitments with his signa-
ture. Then he proves to each auctioneer that he knows the secret key logg h = x
and the discrete logs logg Commit` using interactive zero-knowledge proofs. Fi-
nally, he computes t-out-of-k1 secret shares ri` for each secret seed r` and each
auctioneer ai, and then sends the signed secret share ri` over the one-way untap-
pable channel to the auctioneer ai.
Opening phase. Auctioneers together iterate the following steps for each price
p` = pm, pm−1, . . . , p1 until the winning bid is determined.
Each auctioneer ai publishes secret shares ri` (the `-th secret share of a bidder
sent to auctioneer ai) of all bidders. For each bidder, all auctioneers work together
to reconstruct the secret seed r`, and check for each bidder whether
Commit`
?= gMyeshr` .
If there exists some bidders that the above equivalences of those bidders are
satisfied, the auctioneers finish checking the current price and stop. In this case,
the price ` is the winning price, those bidders are winning bidders. If there is no
equivalence existing, which means there is no bidder bidding for the price `, the
auctioneers repeat the above process on the next lower price.
Informal reasoning of receipt-freeness. We use M to represent either Myes or
Mno , the formula for computing Commit` is of the following form:
Commit` = gM · hr` = gM · (gx)r` = gM+xr` ,
since h = gx. Thus, log Commit` = M+xr`. By using interactive zero-knowledge
proofs, a bidder is proved to know his secret key x and discrete logs log Commit`.
An interesting property of chameleon bit commitments is that if the bidder bids
for price p`,
log Commit` = Myes + xr`
he can calculate a fake r′` such that:
log Commit` = Mno + xr′` and r
′
` = (Myes + xr` −Mno)/x.
Using the fake r′`, the bidder can show that bit-commitment Commit` is opened
as message Mno , which means bidder did not bid for price `. Using the same
method, a bidder can open a ‘no’ bit-commitment, as a ‘yes’ bit-commitment.
Thus, the commit leaks no information concerning the bid, thus the bidder can-
not prove how he bid, e.g. receipt-freeness is satisfied.
1 t is a threshold, k is the number of auctioneers, it means only more than t auctioneers
together can reconstruct the secret seeds.
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4 Modelling
We use the applied pi calculus to model the AS02 protocol.2 We use two simpli-
fications. In the protocol, auctioneers are cooperating to find the winning bid.
It takes at least t auctioneers to decide the winner, thus guaranteeing t-out-of-k
secrecy. As we focus on bidder privacy, we need to consider only one honest auc-
tioneer. Thus, we simplified the model to have only one honest auctioneer. The
AS02 protocol uses interactive zero knowledge proofs to guarantee that each bid-
der knows his secret key and the discrete logs of bit-commitments. However, the
details of these proofs are left unspecified, and thus we did not include them in
the model. We simply assume that each bidder knows his secret key and discrete
logs of bit-commitments.
Signature and equational theory. The signatures and the equational theory model
cryptographic primitives used in the protocol. We fix a list of bidders (b1, . . . , bn)
and an ordered list of prices (p1, . . . , pm), which are modelled as functions with
arity 0. We define function nextbidder to find the next bidder in the bidder list,
and function nextprice to find the next lower price in the price list. Function
checksign is used to check whether the public signature key is the right one for
the signed message, and we use function getmsg to get the original message
from a signed message. Particularly, chameleon bit commitments are modeled
as a function commit with arity 3 (random number, public key of the bidder
and message M either Myes or Mno). The relevant properties of chameleon bit
commitments are captured in the following equational theory.
commit(r, pk(sk b),Myes) = commit(f(r), pk(sk b),Mno)
commit(r, pk(sk b),Mno) = commit(f(r), pk(sk b),Myes)
open(commit(r, pk,m), r, pk) = m
Constants Mno and Myes represent “I do not bid” and “I bid”, respectively. The
parameter pk(sk b) is the public key of bidder b, and r is the secret seed the
bidder chooses. Function f(r) returns the fake secret seed of a secret seed r. We
can model the function f by just giving one parameter - the real secret seed.
Because we assume that each bidder knows his secret key and discrete logs of
bit-commitments, he can compute the fake secret seed for each real secret seed,
as explained in the previous section. The first equivalence means that if a bidder
chooses a secret seed r, bids for a price, and calculates the bit commitment
commit(r, pk(sk b),Myes), he can compute a fake secret seed f(r), and by using
this fake secret seed, the bit-commitment can be opened as message Mno , which
means “I do not bid”. The second equivalence shows that the opposite situation
also holds. A bidder can also open a bit-commitment as if he bids for that price,
when actually he does not.
2 The complete model in ProVerif is available on http://satoss.uni.lu/members/
naipeng/publications.php.
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P , ν privchb1 · ν privchb2 · . . . · ν privchbn ·
ν untapchb1 · ν untapchb2 · . . . · ν untapchbn ·
ν synch·
(PK | (let pb = pb1 in let untapch = untapchb1 in
let privch = privchb1 in let ch = ch1 in PB) |
. . . | (let pb = pbn in let untapch = untapchbn in
let privch = privchbn in let ch = chn in PB) | PA)
Fig. 1. The main process.
PK , ν sskb1 · ν sskb2 · . . . · ν sskbn ·
let spkb1 = pk(sskb1) in
. . .
let spkbn = pk(sskbn) in
(out(privchb1 , sskb1) | . . . | out(privchbn , sskbn) |
out(ch, spkb1) | . . . | out(ch, spkbn))
Fig. 2. The key distribution process.
PB , in(privch, sskb)·
ν skb · out(ch, sign(pk(skb), sskb))·
ν r1 · . . . · ν rm·
if p1 = pb
then let cmtp1 = commit(r1, pk(skb),Myes) in
else let cmtp1 = commit(r1, pk(skb),Mno) in
. . .
if pm = pb
then let cmtpm = commit(rm, pk(skb),Myes) in
else let cmtpm = commit(rm, pk(skb),Mno) in
out(ch, sign((cmtp1 , . . . , cmtpm), sskb))·
out(untapch, (r1, . . . , rm))
Fig. 3. The bidder process.
PA , let b = b1 in readinfo | . . . | let b = bn in readinfo |
in(synch, vb1) · . . . · in(synch, vbn)| {z }
n
·




then out(winnerch, (pm, b1))·
if nextbidder(b1) = ⊥
then stop
else let b = nextbidder(b1) in let p = pm in checknextb
else if nextbidder(b1) = ⊥
then if nextprice(pm) = >
then stop
else let b = b1 in let p = nextprice(pm) in checknextbnp
else let b = nextbidder(b1) in let p = pm in checknextbnp
Fig. 4. The auctioneer process.
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Main process. The main process is represented in Fig. 1. This process first gener-
ates private channels: privchbj for each bidder bj to receive secret keys, untapchbj
shared between each bidder bj and the auctioneer, synch used by the auctioneer
to collect all necessary information before moving to the opening phase. Note
that ch is a public channel, and pb1 , . . . , pbn are parameters, each of these param-
eters has to be instantiated with a constant in the published price list p1, . . . , pm.
Then the main process launches the key distribution sub-process, n (number of
bidders) copies of bidder sub-processes and one auctioneer sub-process.
Key distribution process. The key distribution process PK , presented in Fig. 2,
generates a signature key sskbj for each bidder Bj , sends it to the bidder through
the private channel privchbj , and publishes the corresponding public signature
key. Therefore, only a bidder knows his own secret key, and everyone including
the adversary knows each bidder’s public signature key.
Bidder process. First, a bidder receives his secret signature key from his private
channel. Next, the bidder generates his secret key sk b, and chooses a series of
random numbers r1 . . . rm as secret seeds. The bidder then computes each bit-
commitment cmtp` as described in Sect. 3. Finally, the bidder publishes the series
of bit-commitments cmtp1 , . . . , cmtpm with his signature, and sends the series of
secret seeds to the auctioneer through the untappable channel. As we assume
there is only one honest auctioneer in the model, we do not need to model secret
shares. The applied pi calculus process for a bidder PB is given in Fig. 3.
Auctioneer process. During the bidding phase, the auctioneer launches n copies
of sub-process readinfo to gather information from each bidder bj , consisting of
public signature key spkbj , signed public key sign(pk(sk bj ), ssk bj ), series of bit-
commitments cmtp1bj , . . . , cmt
pm
bj




also needs to synchronise with all bidders. The auctioneer process is not allowed
to continue until all bidders reach the end of the bidding phase. During the
opening phase, the auctioneer evaluates cmtpmbj
?= commit(sspmbj , pkbj ,Myes) for
each bidder. If the two values are equivalent, bidder bj has bid for that price,
otherwise, bidder bj does not bid for that price. Once the auctioneer has deter-
mined the set of the winning bids, he publishes the set of the winning bidders
together with the winning price through the public channel winnerch, and stops
the process. Otherwise, the auctioneer repeats the evaluation steps for each bid-
der at the next lower price. In a similar way, the sub-process checknextb is used
to evaluate the bid of a bidder b at price p, if there are already some winners
before bidder b. And the sub-process checknextbnp is used to check the next
bidder at price p, if there is no winner before that bidder. We use ⊥ and > to
represent the end of the bidder list and price list, respectively.
5 Analysis
After modelling the protocol in the previous section, now we formalise and anal-
yse the two privacy-type properties: bidding-price-secrecy and receipt-freeness.
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5.1 ProVerif
ProVerif is a tool for verifying security properties in cryptographic protocols.
Given a security property as a query, ProVerif can take a protocol modelled as
a process in the applied pi calculus as input, and returns whether the protocol
satisfies the security property.
In ProVerif, standard secrecy of a term M is defined as “an adversary cannot
derive the term M”. To check standard secrecy, we use query “not attacker : M”.
The positive query result means, no matter how the adversary interacts with the
protocol, M will never be part of adversary’s knowledge. Otherwise, ProVerif
gives a counterexample to show how an adversary derives the term M .
In ProVerif, strong secrecy is defined as: for all closed substitutions σ and σ′
of free variables in a process P , the process satisfies Pσ ≈ Pσ′ (where ≈ denotes
observational equivalence). To check strong secrecy of variable x, we can use
the query “noninterf x”. Intuitively, by instantiating x with different values, we
obtain different versions of the given process. A protocol satisfies strong secrecy
iff these different versions of the given process are observationally equivalent. The
fundamental idea of observational equivalence checking in ProVerif is to focus
on pairs of processes sharing the same structure and differing only in terms or
destructors. ProVerif’s reasoning about strong secrecy is sound but incomplete.
If ProVerif reports that a process does not satisfy strong secrecy, there are two
possibilities: either the process does not satisfy strong secrecy, or the process
satisfies strong secrecy, but ProVerif cannot prove it.
5.2 Bidding-price-secrecy
Bidding-price-secrecy guarantees the anonymity of the link between a bidder and
the price he bids for. In the AS02 protocol, the winning bid is published, and
thus bidding-price-secrecy for the winning bidder is not satisfied. Particularly,
if all bidders bid for the same price, then all bidders are winners, i.e. no bidder
is a non-winning bidder, thus bidding-price-secrecy is not satisfied in this case.
From here on, when we refer to bidding-price-secrecy, we mean only w.r.t. non-
winning bids. There are two notions of secrecy: standard bidding-price-secrecy
and strong bidding-price-secrecy.
Standard bidding-price-secrecy. Standard bidding-price-secrecy is defined as no
matter how an adversary interacts with the protocol, he cannot determine which
price in the price list a non-winning bidder has bid for.
In order to show that an adversary cannot determine the bidding price of a
non-winning bidder, we can use the standard secrecy query in ProVerif. We have
a winning bidder process in which a bidder submits the highest bid. And we have
several other bidder processes. Each of these processes has a variable pb repre-
senting the price the bidder bids for. The variable pb can be instantiated by any
price in the price list, except the highest price. By inquiring “not attacker : pb”,
we check whether an adversary can derive the bidding price of a non-winning
bidder. ProVerif gives us positive results, which means the protocol satisfies the
property of standard bidding-price-secrecy.
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Strong bidding-price-secrecy. Strong bidding-price-secrecy means an adversary
cannot distinguish between the case when a bidder bids for price a and the case
when a bidder bids for price c. In other words, an adversary cannot tell whether
a bidder changes his bidding price from a to c. We use observational equivalence
in the applied pi calculus to formalise strong bidding-price-secrecy.
Similar formalisation has been used in the domain of voting. In [11], a similar
property called vote-privacy is formalised as a process in which VA votes for a
and VB votes for c is observationally equivalent to a process where VA votes for
c and VB votes for a. The idea is that even all other voters reveal how they
voted, an adversary cannot deduce the votes of VA and VB , given VA and VB
counterbalance each other. Different from privacy in voting that the result is
published, in auction protocols, normally a non-winning bidder’s bidding price
is not published. Therefore, we do not need a counterbalancing process. Instead,
we need a process in which a bidder bids for higher price to stop the auctioneer
process opening non-winning bids, so that non-winning bids are not revealed in
the opening phase. Therefore, strong bid-price-secrecy is formalised as follows:
Definition 3 (Strong bidding-price-secrecy). An auction protocol P , with
a bidder sub-process represented as PB, is strong bidding-price-secret if for all
possible bidders b1 and b2 we have:
S[P 1B{a/pb} | P 2B{d/pb}] ≈` S[P 1B{c/pb} | P 2B{d/pb}]
with a < d and c < d.
The context S is used to capture the assumption made on the checked protocol,
usually it includes the other honest participants in the protocol. The process
P 1B is a non-winning bidder process executed by bidder b1. The process P
2
B is a
bidder process in which the bidder b2 bids for a higher price d. The intuition is
that an adversary cannot determine whether a non-winning bidder bids for price
a or price c, provided there exists another bidder bids for a higher price d.
We define the context S as νr˜ · (PK | PBσ1 | . . . | PBσn−2 | PA | ) in the
AS02 protocol, where r˜ are channel names, PK is the key distribution process,
PBσi are some other honest bidder processes (1 ≤ i ≤ n − 2), and PA is the
auctioneer process. The context is as the auction process with a hole instead of
two bidder processes. We assume all the participants in the context are honest.
In order to make it possible to check strong bidding-price-secrecy in ProVerif, we
need to modify the presented auctioneer process. Note that ProVerif is sensitive
to evaluations of statements in the if-then-else constructs. ProVerif reports false
attacks, when using these constructions [15]. We can simplify the process by
halting the process after checking price d, i.e. if-then-else constructs beyond the
checking of price d are cut off. Since we assume there is a process bidding a
high price d in the equivalence in the definition of strong bidding-price-secrecy,
the auctioneer process will stop after checking price d (or even sooner), and
the remaining part of the process will not be executed. Therefore, we can cut
the remaining part of the auctioneer process without affecting the verification
result. To be able to check noninterf in ProVerif, we modify the bidder process
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by replacing if-then-else constructions with choice[ ] constructions (see [15] for
more explanation). By querying “noninterf pb among p1, . . . , pd−1”, the variable
pb is replaced with p1 up to pd−1, resulting into d − 1 different versions of the
process. ProVerif gives a positive result, which means that these process versions
are all observationally equivalent. In this way, we prove that the protocol satisfies
strong bidding-price-secrecy.
5.3 Receipt-freeness
Receipt-freeness means a bidder cannot prove to an adversary that he has bid
in a certain way. It is useful to protect bidders from being coerced to show how
they bid. Intuitively, bidding-price-secrecy protects a bidder’s privacy when the
bidder does not want to reveal his information, while receipt-freeness protects
a bidder’s privacy when the bidder is willing to reveal his information or the
bidder is coerced to reveal his information.
In voting, receipt-freeness can be formalised as an observational equiva-
lence [11]. A protocol satisfies receipt-freeness if there exists a process V ′, in
which a voter votes for candidate a but feigns cooperation with the adversary
by telling him that he votes for a different candidate c. The adversary cannot
tell the difference between a situation in which a voter genuinely cooperates with
him and the one in which the voter pretends to cooperate but actually votes for
another candidate, as these two cases are observationally equivalent. In order to
model observational equivalence, the situation that a voter is willing to provide
his secret information to the adversary needs to be modelled first:
Definition 4 (Process P ch [11]). Let P be a plain process and ch a channel
name. P ch, the process that shares all of p’s secrets, is defined as:
– 0ch=ˆ0,
– (P |Q)ch=ˆP ch|Qch,
– (νn.P )ch=ˆνn.out(ch, n).P ch when n is name of base type,
– (νn.P )ch=ˆνn.P ch otherwise,
– (in(u, x).P )ch=ˆin(u, x).out(ch, x).P ch when x is a variable of base type,
– (in(u, x).P )ch=ˆin(u, x).P ch otherwise,
– (out(u,M).P )ch=ˆout(u,M).P ch,
– (!P )ch=ˆ!P ch,
– (if M =E N then P else Q)ch=ˆif M =E N then P ch else Qch.
Delaune et al. also define process transformation A\out(ch,·), which can be con-
sidered as the process A hides out(ch, ·) (the outputs on the public channel ch).
Definition 5 (Process A\out(ch,·) [11]). Let A be an extended process. We
define the process A\out(ch,·) as νch.(A|!in(ch, x)).
When modelling online auction protocols, we also need to model the situation
a bidder wants to provide his secret information to an adversary. We use the
above definition directly in our model. Intuitively, a bidder, who is willing to
share information with the adversary, sends any input of base type, any freshly
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generated names of base type to the adversary through a public channel ch. It
is assumed that public channels are under adversaries’ control.
Now, we can define receipt-freeness for online auction protocols. Again, we
need a bidder process P 2B in which bidder b2 bids for a higher price d, so that non-
winning bids are not revealed. Intuitively, if a non-winning bid has a strategy
to cheat the adversary, and the adversary cannot tell the difference between
whether the bidder cheats or not, then the protocol is receipt-free.
Definition 6 (Receipt-freeness). An auction protocol P , with a bidder sub-
process PB, is receipt-free if there exists a closed plain process PB ′ such that:
1. PB ′\out(chc,·) ≈` P 1B{c/pb},
2. S[P 1B{a/pb}chc | P 2B{d/pb}] ≈` S[PB ′ | P 2B{d/pb}]
with d > c and d > a.
Process PB ′ is a bidder process in which bidder b1 bids for price c but com-
municates with the adversary and tells the adversary he bids for price a. Pro-
cess P 1B{c/pb} is a bidder process in which bidder b1 bids for price c. Process
P 1B{a/pb}chc is a bidder process in which bidder b1 bids for price a and shares his
secret with the adversary. Process P 2B is a bidder process in which bidder b2 bids
for a higher price d. The first equivalence says that ignoring the outputs bidder
b1 makes on the adversary channel chc, PB ′ looks like a normal process in which
b1 bidding for price c. The second equivalence says that the adversary cannot tell
the difference between the situation in which b1 obeys the adversary’s commands
and bids for price a, and the situation in which b1 pretends to cooperate but
actually bids for price c, provided there is a bidding process P 2B that bids higher,
ensuring that bidding processes P 1B and PB
′ are not winner. Receipt-freeness is
a stronger property than bidding-price-secrecy, as shown in [11].
PB
′ , in(privch, sskb) · out(chc, sskb)·
ν skb · out(chc, skb)·
out(ch, sign(pk(skb), sskb))·
ν r1 · . . . · ν ra · . . . · ν rc · . . . · ν rm·
out(chc, (r1, . . . , f(ra), . . . , f(rc), . . . , rm))·
let cmtp1 = commit(r1, pk(skb),Mno) in
. . .
let cmtpa = commit(ra, pk(skb),Mno) in
. . .
let cmtpc = commit(rc, pk(skb),Myes) in
. . .
let cmtpm = commit(rm, pk(skb),Mno) in
out(ch, sign((cmtp1 , . . . , cmtpm), sskb))·
out(untapch, (r1, . . . , ra, . . . , rc, . . . , rm))·
Fig. 5. The process PB
′.
For the AS02 protocol, the context S is defined the same as in the analysis of
the bidding-price-secrecy property. To prove receipt-freeness, we need to find a
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process PB ′ which satisfies both equivalences in the definition of receipt-freeness.
According to the properties of chameleon bit commitment, the bidder can send a
sequence of fake secret seeds to the adversary, and sends the series of real secret
seeds to the auctioneer through an untappable channel. The adversary opens the
bit-commitments as the bidder bids for price a, using the fake secret seeds he re-
ceived, while the auctioneer opens the same bit-commitments as the bidder bids
for price c, using the secret seeds the auctioneer received through a untappable
channel. The process PB ′ is shown in Fig. 5. The bidder in this process commu-
nicates with the adversary through channel chc, sending the adversary his secret
signature key ssk b and his secret key sk b. Later the bidder sends the auction-
eer r1, . . . , rm through an untappable channel, and send the adversary the same
list except changing ra and rc to f(ra) and f(rc), respectively. The untappable
channel ensures the adversary cannot learn anything about the differences.
To prove the first equivalence, we can simply consider PB ′\out(chc,·) as process
PB
′ without communication on the channel chc. Since the process PB ′\out(chc,·)
is exactly the same as the process P 1B{c/pb}, the first equivalence of Def. 6 is
satisfied. To show the second equivalence of Def. 6, we need to consider all
the executions of each side. On both sides, the process PK only distributes
keys, and all the bidder processes in the context follow the same process. For
the sake of simplicity, we can ignore the outputs in the process PK and those
bidder processes. During the bidding phase the auctioneer process only reads
information and synchronises on the private channel synch. There is no output
on public channels in the auctioneer process. We denote the sequence of names
sk b, r1, . . . , rm, bsk b, br1, . . . , brm by n˜. After the key distribution, we want to see
whether the behaviour of the process P 1B{a/pb}chc | P 2B{d/pb} is observationally
equivalent to PB ′ | P 2B{d/pb}. For this purpose, we need to consider all possible
executions of these two processes. Here, we consider a particular execution and
only show the interesting part of the two frames after each step of execution by
the two processes. Let P = P 1B{a/pb}chc | P 2B{d/pb} and Q = PB ′ | P 2B{d/pb}.
P
in(privch,sskb)−−−−−−−−−−→ in(privchb,bsskb)−−−−−−−−−−−→ ν x1· out(chc,x1)−−−−−−−−−−−→ P1 | {sskb/x1}
ν x2· out(chc,x2)−−−−−−−−−−−→ νn˜ · (P2 | {sskb/x1} | {skb/x2})
ν x3· out(ch,x3)−−−−−−−−−−→
ν x4· out(chc,x4)−−−−−−−−−−−→ νn˜ · (P3 | {sskb/x1} | {skb/x2} | {sign(pk(skb),sskb)/x3}
| {sign(pk(bskb),bsskb)/x4})
ν x5· out(chc,x5)−−−−−−−−−−−→ νn˜ · (P4 | {sskb/x1} | {skb/x2} | {sign(pk(skb),sskb)/x3}
| {sign(pk(bskb),bsskb)/x4} | {r1,...,rm/x5})
ν x6· out(ch,x6)−−−−−−−−−−→
ν x7· out(chc,x7)−−−−−−−−−−−→ νn˜ · (P5 | {sskb/x1} | {skb/x2} | {sign(pk(skb),sskb)/x3}
| {sign(pk(bskb),bsskb)/x4}
| {r1,...,rm/x5} | {sign((cmtp1 ,...,cmtpm ),sskb)/x6}
| {sign((bcmtp1 ,...,bcmtpm ),bsskb)/x7})
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Q
in(privch,sskb)−−−−−−−−−−→ in(privchb,bsskb)−−−−−−−−−−−→ ν x1· out(chc,x1)−−−−−−−−−−−→ Q1 | {sskb/x1}
ν x2· out(chc,x2)−−−−−−−−−−−→ νn˜ · (Q2 | {sskb/x1} | {skb/x2})
ν x3· out(ch,x3)−−−−−−−−−−→
ν x4· out(ch,x4)−−−−−−−−−−→ νn˜ · (Q3 | {sskb/x1} | {skb/x2} | {sign(pk(skb),sskb)/x3}
| {sign(pk(bskb),bsskb)/x4})




ν x7· out(ch,x7)−−−−−−−−−−→ νn˜ · (Q5 | {sskb/x1} | {skb/x2} | {sign(pk(skb),sskb)/x3}
| {sign(pk(bskb),bsskb)/x4}
| {r1,...,f(ra),...,f(rc),...,rm/x5}
| {sign((cmtp1 ,...,cmtpm ),sskb)/x6}
| {sign((bcmtp1 ,...,bcmtpm ),bsskb)/x7})
The frames we obtained at the end of P and Q are statically equivalent.
In particular, as the adversary knows the bit-commitments the bidder submits,
the public key of the bidder, and the secret seeds, the adversary can open all
the commitments. The only functions an adversary can use are getmsg and
open. By applying these two functions, the adversary can get other terms, the
public key of the bidder represented as xmsg = getmsg(x3, x1) and a series of
opened messages. Since x3 and x1 are the same for both P and Q, xmsg is
the same for both processes as well. Particularly, P 1B{a/pb} bids for price a.
The adversary opens the commitments cmtpa = commit(ra, pk(sk b),Myes) and
cmtpc = commit(rc, pk(sk b),Mno):
open(cmtpa , ra, pk(sk b)) = Myes open(cmtpc , rc, pk(sk b)) = Mno
For the process Q, the process PB ′ bids for price c. The adversary has a se-
quence of secret seeds, in which two of them are fake: f(ra) and f(rc). According
to the equational theory of chameleon bit-commitments (see Sect. 4), the ad-
versary opens cmtpa = commit(ra, pk(sk b),Mno) = commit(f(ra), pk(sk b),Myes)
and cmtpc = commit(rc, pk(sk b),Myes) = commit(f(rc), pk(sk b),Mno) as follows:
open(cmtpa , f(ra), pk(sk b)) = Myes open(cmtpc , f(rc), pk(sk b)) = Mno
All other secret seeds and bit-commitments are the same in both P and Q, hence
the adversary gets the same series of opened messages for both P and Q as well.
Next, we consider the opening phase, the auctioneer process is the only active
process. According to the protocol, the auctioneer process stops after finding
the winning bid. Therefore, non-winning bids are not revealed. Since we have
assumed the auctioneer is honest, the information the auctioneer process reveals
is the opened bit-commitments of all bidders at prices higher than the winning
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price, and the winning bid. Only the winning bid is opened as Myes , others are
opened as Mno . Due to the existence of a higher bid (d in the process P 2B{d/pb})
on both sides of the equivalence, the bid made by the bidder b1 will never be
published, hence the information the auctioneer process reveals is the same. Now,
we can conclude that the protocol satisfies receipt-freeness.
6 Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper is that we propose a formalisation of two
privacy-type properties in auction protocols: bidding-price-secrecy and receipt-
freeness, following definitions of vote privacy and receipt-freeness in voting [11].
There are two notions of bidding-price-secrecy: standard bidding-price-secrecy
and strong bidding-price-secrecy. Standard bidding-price-secrecy is defined as
that an adversary does not know a non-winning bidder’s bidding price. Strong
bidding-price-secrecy and receipt-freeness are modelled using observational equiv-
alence. We have modelled the AS02 protocol in the applied pi calculus, verified
bidding-price-secrecy of the protocol automatically using ProVerif and receipt-
freeness of the protocol manually.
Coercion-resistance in voting is a stronger privacy property than receipt-
freeness [11], saying that a voter cannot cooperate with a coercer to prove to
him that he voted in a certain way. It is modelled by giving the coercer the
ability to communicate with the coercee and the ability to prepare information
for the coercee to use [11]. In more details, coercion-resistance is formalised in
the applied pi calculus by requiring the existence of a process in which a voter
can do as he wants, despite the presence of the coercer, and the coercer cannot
tell whether the voter is cheating. According to this definition, it seems to us
that the AS02 protocol is also coercion-resistant. The information a coercer
can generate in the bidder process is: the bidder’s secret key sk b, the random
number r1, . . . , ra, . . . , rc, . . . rm, the bit-commitments cmtp1 , . . . , cmtpm . Since
the zero-knowledge proof ensures the bidder knows his own secret key, as well
as the discrete logs of bit-commitments, a bidder can figure out which price
the coercer wants him to bid, and then calculate the fake secret seeds f(ra)
and f(rc) to change the price the coercer calculated, and sends secret seeds
r1, . . . , ra−1, f(ra), ra+1, . . . , rc−1, f(rc), rc+1, . . . , rm to the auctioneer.
Coercion-resistance is a complicated property to formalise. Several different
formalisations have been given [16–18], in addition to Delaune, Kremer and
Ryan’s work. In the future, we intend to study coercion-resistance in online
auction protocols.
The AS02 protocol reveals the winning bid. Bidding-price-secrecy and receipt-
freeness only hold for non-winners. In [6], Chen et al. propose another auction
protocol which can ensure the winner’s privacy as well. We are also interested
in formally verifying this protocol.
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